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Abstract 
Prediction markets, sometimes called information markets, idea markets or 
event futures, are similar to financial stock markets where the “stocks” and their 
prices reflect the consensus view regarding the outcomes of specifically defined 
future probabilistic events. Prediction markets quickly and efficiently gather and 
summarize information from a disparate and diverse group of people, providing a 
two-way information flow; individual traders are informed by the consensus opinion 
and their market decisions inform the aggregate consensus. 
The remarkable accuracy of prediction markets in forecasting election results, 
economic outcomes, and other variables has defense managers intrigued by the 
possibility of applying these markets as a managerial decision tool.  Overall, 
implementing prediction markets is straight forward, but in practice the devil is in the 
details, including security or contact design, trading rules, participation incentives, 
and the number and characteristics of the traders. Small changes in any design 
element can significantly affect prediction market performance.  
This research highlights the implementation issues involved in designing and 
running prediction markets.  If improperly designed, prediction markets will be 
confusing and uninformative, at best.  Poorly designed early pilots can portray 
prediction markets as a flawed concept as opposed to a useful concept with a flawed 
implementation.   
Keywords: Prediction markets, information aggregation, information markets, 
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1. Introduction 
Prediction markets (PMs), sometimes called information markets, idea 
markets or event futures, are essentially small-scale securities markets.  They are 
similar to financial stock markets, however the ultimate value of “stocks” or “shares” 
traded depends upon the outcome of specifically defined future events, rather than 
on the future earnings of a publicly traded company. Similarly, whereas a company’s 
stock price reflects the real-time consensus view of that company’s future earnings, 
stock prices in prediction markets reflect the real-time consensus view about the 
expected outcome of the associated future events. 
In their review of prediction markets, Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos (2007) 
described prediction markets based upon a definition by Berg, Nelson, and Rietz 
(2008): 
Prediction markets are defined as markets that are designed and run for the 
primary purpose of mining and aggregating information scattered among 
traders and subsequently using this information in the form of market values 
in order to make predictions about specific future events. (p. 1) 
Prediction markets are an excellent way to quickly and efficiently gather and 
summarize information from a disparate and diverse group of people.  Prediction 
markets aggregate knowledge in a unique way.  From the perspective of an 
individual trader, the current market price represents the collective consensus 
among other market participants.  Viewing this consensus allows an individual trader 
to make his or her own assessment by combining the market’s aggregated 
information with his or her own private information.  Thus, prediction markets provide 
a two-way information flow; individual traders are informed by the consensus opinion 
and their market decisions inform the aggregate consensus. 
Research has demonstrated that the collective judgment of a large group, 
none of whom may be “experts” on a particular issue, will usually be more accurate 
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and Zitzewitz, 2004) Each participant in a prediction market, ranging from high-level 
managers to “assembly-line” workers, can provide a unique perspective and 
valuable information about the future outcome in question.  The trading prices in 
prediction markets provide management with a timely, accurate, and continuously 
updated picture about the likelihood of future events—enabling them to evaluate risk 
and provide an early warning of issues requiring management attention. 
Both the understanding of PMs and the range of market applications have 
been growing in recent years.  For example, PMs have been employed to predict 
election outcomes and have been found to do so more accurately than existing 
polling mechanisms (Berg et al., 2008).  In addition, corporations have used PMs to 
predict new product (or project) sales, launch dates, regulatory approval, and 
achievement of development milestones. 
What PMs do that other methods of gathering dispersed personal information 
cannot, is aggregate many opinions into a single, collective, market-based forecast 
of future events. A PM also allows participants to express what may be unpopular 
opinions in an anonymous fashion. 
The U.S. Navy, like corporations, is interested in many important but 
uncertain future outcomes, such as recruiting and retention success and milestone 
or delivery dates for certain acquisitions.  Given these uncertainties, a well-designed 
prediction market applied to forecasting such relevant future outcomes could provide 
the Navy with valuable information.  Greater information on these outcomes could 
help the Navy plan better and allocate or manage resources more efficiently. For 
example, having more accuracy in predicting the final fiscal-year retention numbers 
would help the Navy plan for their recruiting goal for the following year.  Similarly, 
more accurately predicting the date at which an acquisition program will achieve a 
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2. From “Stock” Price to Prediction 
Before delving further into the promise and pitfalls of prediction markets for 
military forecasting, it is critical to understand what PM prices actually predict (or 
what they are intended to predict). The nature of these predictions depends critically 
on the definition or design of the stocks or securities being traded. 
In private-sector stock markets, for example, it is important to understand that 
what is actually being traded are company shares, which are each, in essence, a 
contract which entitles the shareholder to certain future rights (such as a claim on 
that company’s future earnings). Traders in prediction markets are similarly buying 
and selling contracts which specify how the payoffs to holders of these contracts are 
tied to future events. 
Common types of contracts traded in prediction markets include: 
(1) “winner-take-all” contracts, which pay off a fixed amount if and only if a 
specific event occurs; 
(2) “index” contracts, which pay off a variable amount which is tied to a 
specific future measure; and 
(3) “spread” contracts, which combine aspects of the winner-take-all and 
index contract types, paying off a fixed amount if and only if a specific 
future measure is above or below a threshold, which is adjusted by the 
market-maker to balance the two sides of the market (just as the 
“point-spread” is adjusted in football betting). 
What any particular PM is actually designed to predict is very much a function 
of the type of contract being traded. In particular, the market price of a winner-take-
all contract reflects the market expectation of the probability of a specific future 
event. The market price of an index contract reflects the market expectation of the 
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reflects the market expectation of the median value (or any other percentile value of 
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3. An Illustration of a Prediction Market in Action 
To understand how a prediction market actually aggregates information, 
consider this simple example: Suppose that there are three possible (mutually-
exclusive) outcomes of some future event. For simplicity, let us label these 
outcomes A, B, and C. Further suppose that there is a prediction market in which 
traders buy and sell shares associated with each outcome (A shares, B shares, and 
C shares, respectively). 
Suppose that the shares in the prediction market are winner-take-all 
contracts, such that each outcome’s associated shares pay off $100 each if that 
particular outcome occurs and pay off $0 otherwise. Thus, if outcome A occurs, A 
shares will pay off $100 each, while B shares and C shares will pay off nothing ($0 
each). If outcome B occurs, B shares will pay off $100 each, while A shares and C 
shares will pay off nothing ($0 each). Finally, if outcome C occurs, C shares will pay 
off $100 each, while A shares and B shares will pay off nothing ($0 each). 
Prediction Market Prices as Consensus Opinion 
Suppose that each outcome is initially considered equally likely by all traders. 
Thus, all traders initially believe that there is a 33.33% chance that outcome A will 
occur, a 33.33% chance that outcome B will occur, and a 33.33% chance that 
outcome C will occur. Therefore, each trader estimates that there is a 33.33% 
chance that any particular outcome’s shares will be worth $100 each and a 66.67% 
chance that the shares will be worthless. Hence, each trader has an initial expected 
value of any share of any of the three outcomes of $33.33 (33.33% x $100). 
In a well-functioning prediction market, therefore, we would expect A shares, 
B shares, and C shares to each quickly achieve a market price around $33.33 each. 
No trader should be willing to buy shares above this price, and no trader should be 
willing to sell shares below this price. Thus, the market prices accurately reflect the 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 6 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
consensus opinion is not very helpful at this point, as it considers all outcomes 
equally likely. 
Information Dissemination in the Prediction Market 
Now let us see what might happen if limited, but valuable, information is 
revealed to one or a few traders. In particular, suppose that, over time, it becomes 
apparent to some traders that certain outcomes are no longer possible. In other 
words, at some point in time, some trader(s) may discover that a particular outcome 
is definitely not going to occur. While such information will only be revealed to one or 
a few market traders at a given time, we assume all traders are aware that other 
traders may receive such definitive “outcome-excluding” information.  While 
unrealistic, this certainty condition simplifies the illustration; without such certainty 
outcomes would not be as definitive. 
For example, suppose trader Alan learns at some point that outcome A will 
not occur, but that outcomes B and C are still considered equally likely. How might 
Alan act on this information? First of all, Alan now knows that A shares are 
worthless, thus he would be willing to sell A shares for any positive price. Similarly, 
Alan now considers outcomes B and C to each have a 50% chance of occurring, so 
he would be willing to buy B or C shares for any price less than $50. 
Now consider what would happen if Alan did, in fact, take the action of selling 
A shares in the prediction market. As noted above, none of the other traders are 
currently willing to pay more than $33.33 for A shares, so Alan would have to offer to 
sell at a price below this amount. Suppose Alan offers to sell A shares at $32 each. 
He might get some initial takers at this price, but the other traders will begin to 
realize that somebody in the market must have learned that outcome A is no longer 
possible. Thus, the market price of A shares will quickly decline to $0. 
Suppose Alan instead decided to act upon his inside information by buying B 
shares or C shares, which he now values at $50 each. As noted above, none of the 
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each, so Alan will have to offer to buy at a price above this amount. Suppose Alan 
offers to buy B shares (or C shares) at $35 each. He might again get some initial 
takers at this price, but the other traders will begin to realize that somebody in the 
market must have learned that outcome B (or C) has suddenly become more likely 
(as the result of another outcome being eliminated). Thus, traders will gradually (if 
not immediately) realize that B shares (or C shares) now must be worth at least $50 
each, and thus the market price of these shares will quickly rise to $50, at which 
point no trader should be willing to pay a price above this amount. 
Furthermore, note that the pricing dynamics for each of the three share types 
will be mutually reinforcing: As the price of A shares declines, this indicates that B 
shares and C shares must be more valuable, and vice versa. Ultimately, Alan’s effort 
to benefit from his private or inside information would result in market prices of $0 for 
A shares, $50 each for B shares, and $50 each for C shares. 
In the scenario described, note that only a single trader actually had any 
information of value, but the nature of the prediction market quickly disseminated 
this inside information to all other traders, as if they had the same knowledge first-
hand. This is the fundamental characteristic of prediction markets: The market 
creates an incentive for individual traders to act on (or take advantage of) their own 
private or inside information (or assessment), yet acting on this information 
necessarily disseminates this previously private information to others. Hence, 
prediction markets make private information public. 
Information Aggregation in the Prediction Market 
Now let us see what might happen in the prediction market when further 
valuable information is revealed to traders. Suppose, in particular, that trader Bill 
now discovers that outcome B is no longer possible and that only outcome A or 
outcome C can possibly occur. Based on this private information alone, Bill would 
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Alan’s previously private information (that outcome A will not occur) has 
already been disseminated to all traders in the market; however, Bill can fully 
deduce that neither outcome A nor B are possible, so outcome C is going to occur. 
Thus, Bill considers A and B shares to be worthless and values C shares at $100 
each. 
Now consider what would happen if Bill were to act on his new private 
information. As noted above, after the dissemination of Alan’s private information, 
the prevailing market prices would be $0 for A shares, $50 each for B shares, and 
$50 each for C shares. Thus, Bill could profit by selling B shares for any positive 
price and could profit by buying C shares for any price less than $100. 
However, to sell B shares Bill will have to offer to sell at some price below $50 
which, by the same dynamic described above, will gradually (if not immediately) 
reveal to other traders that further inside information regarding outcome B has been 
revealed to some trader(s). Thus, other traders will begin to realize that B shares are 
worthless and the market price will quickly decline to $0. 
Suppose Bill instead decided to act upon his inside information by buying C 
shares, which he now values at $100 each. Because none of the other traders would 
be willing to sell C shares for any price below $50 each, Bill would have to offer to 
buy at a price above this amount. However, in doing so other traders will again begin 
to realize that somebody in the market must have learned that outcome C will, in 
fact, occur. Thus, traders will gradually (if not immediately) realize that C shares now 
must be worth $100 each, and thus the market price of these shares will quickly rise 
to $100. 
Again, note that the opposite pricing dynamics for B and C shares will be 
mutually reinforcing: As the price of B shares declines, this indicates that C shares 
must be more valuable, and vice versa. Ultimately, Bill’s effort to benefit from his 
private or inside information would result in market prices of $0 for A shares, $0 for B 
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Information Aggregation vs. Information Averaging 
While the example above was hypothetical, note that this same scenario has 
been simulated in laboratory prediction markets using human subjects, and the 
result is the same: The prediction market fully aggregates the information available 
to all traders and accurately predicts the correct outcome (Plott & Sunder, 1982). 
It is significant to note that, in the scenario described, no single trader had 
private information that revealed the true eventual outcome. Instead, the vast 
majority of traders had absolutely zero private information, while two traders had 
limited private information that individually eliminated only one of the three possible 
outcomes. Thus, information about the future outcome was limited, fragmented, 
dispersed, and private. Yet, despite these problematic information conditions, the 
prediction market fully aggregated the information to formulate an accurate 
consensus forecast. 
It is also important to distinguish how information aggregation is different—
and more accurate—than information averaging. One might think, for example, that 
similar prediction accuracy could be achieved if decision-makers simply gathered the 
individual assessments of many (or select) individuals and averaged the result. This 
is incorrect for several reasons. 
First of all, prediction markets create an incentive to reveal privately held 
information: market gains can be achieved only by acting on this information. In 
contrast, there is little incentive to reveal valuable private information in a simple 
survey, particularly if the individuals have some stake in the future outcome (which is 
often the case). 
In addition, it would be very difficult to identify which individuals should be 
surveyed. In a prediction market mechanism, the individuals with valuable 
information self-select: Those who have valuable private information have an 
incentive to proactively trade based on this information, while those who do not have 
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the scenario described above, for example, surveying all traders would incorporate 
numerous poorly informed assessments of 33% chance for each outcome, mitigating 
the impact of the assessments of those individuals who actually do have valuable 
information (Alan and Bill in the example). 
Finally, even if the actual “experts” or “insiders” with valuable private 
information could be identified, averaging their individual assessments would still not 
produce as accurate a forecast as the aggregation of assessments achieved via the 
prediction market. In the scenario above, for example, Alan and Bill each had 
valuable private information. If asked their assessment of the likelihood of each of 
the three outcomes, Alan would assign 0% probability to outcome A, 50% to 
outcome B, and 50% to outcome C. Bill, on the other hand, would assign 50% 
probability to outcome A, 0% to outcome B, and 50% to outcome C. Averaging these 
two experts assessments would assign a combined probability of 25% to outcome A, 
25% to outcome B, and 50% to outcome C. Thus, while averaging the expert 
assessments would, in this case, identify the most likely outcome, it would not match 
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4. Private Sector Prediction Market Applications 
and Results 
Beyond the theoretical or conceptual appeal of the prediction market concept, 
the potential Navy benefit of employing this forecasting tool is also supported by 
numerous “real-world” private-sector applications, many of which have been publicly 
touted as highly successful endeavors. Current private-sector applications of internal 
prediction markets include sales forecasting, project execution, product design, trend 
forecasting, and resource allocation.  
Sales forecasting predicts the likely volume of sales in dollars or units.  
Project execution predicts when projects will reach their planned milestones.  
Product design forecasts which product features or enhancements customers will 
prefer.  Trend forecasting reveals new or existing market, technology, or customer 
trends.  Finally, resource allocation enables business units to trade resources 
according to their needs and can be used to support objectives such as corporate 
social responsibility (Corporate Executive Board, 2006). 
The applications and experiences of some corporate prediction market early-
adopters are summarized in Table 1. In what follows, we will describe in more detail 
the specific design, usage, and results of prediction markets as employed at 
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Table 1. Experiences of Early Prediction Market Adopters 
(Kiviat, 2004; Malone, 2004) 





Hewlett-Packard used an internal market system to 
forecast printer sales with considerable accuracy. 
Front line sales employees exchanged contracts 
representing the future sales volume based on their 
predictions of future printer sales. When trading ended, 
the contract valued most highly represented the most 
likely sales range. HP’s official forecast erred by 13%, 
while the market erred by 6%. In further trials, the 
market performance exceeded the accuracy of official 
forecasts 75% of the time. 
Product 
Development Eli Lilly 
Eli Lilly applied internal markets to predict correctly 
which of six potential new drugs would have the 
greatest success in passing product development 
hurdles. Employees involved in different stages of drug 
development traded market contracts based on their 
information. The market aggregated information with 
accuracy and opinion detail that would not have 
emerged had traders responded to a poll. 
General 
Forecasting Google 
Google uses internal markets to forecast events such 
as new product launch dates and new office openings. 
The company applies market predictions to determine 




Siemens used internal prediction markets to predict 
software project milestones.  On one occasion, 
traditional methods suggested a software project would 
be delivered on time, but the prediction market 
suggested it would be 2-3 weeks delayed.  The project 
turned out to be 11 workdays late. 
Project 
Milestones Microsoft 
Microsoft uses internal markets to predict whether 
projects will meet milestones articulated in their project 
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Hewlett-Packard 
An internal prediction market was designed and implemented at HP with the 
hope of producing more accurate printer sales forecasts than the firm’s internal 
processes (Chen & Plott, 2002).  A total of twelve predictions were performed over a 
period of three years.  The prediction markets at HP included predictions for eight 
products.  In some cases dollar sales were predicted and in other cases the number 
of units sold was predicted. 
The market design employed at HP was the web-based double auction 
market of Marketscape software, developed at the Laboratory of Economics and 
Political Science at Caltech (Chen & Plott, 2002).  From the web interface, 
participants could enter a buy offer, a sell offer, or acceptance of an offer.  If a trade 
was possible, it was executed and if not, the order was placed in an order book. 
In order to predict future sales of a product, HP established a prediction 
market with multiple securities, each associated with a particular sales volume 
interval. For example, if intervals of 100 units were used, there would be a security 
for 0-100 units sold, 101-200 units sold, and so on.  Depending on the interval in 
which the final outcome falls, the corresponding security pays one dollar per share; 
all other securities pay nothing.  Thus, the HP prediction markets used winner-take-
all contracts. 
The payoff for HP markets involved real money in which the “winning” security 
paid off a fixed amount; all other securities paid nothing.  HP had issues engaging 
employees to participate in an activity in which they may lose money, thus HP 
supplemented participants with money at the beginning of the market sessions to 
ensure participation and minimize the potential employee loss (Chen & Plott, 2002).  
The markets at HP typically included 20-30 people, mostly from the marketing and 
finance divisions (Chen & Plott, 2002).  Additionally, about five participants were 
from HP Labs, who had little or no information about the predicted event, but 
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The internal prediction market forecasts at HP were closer to the actual sales 
outcomes than the official forecasts in six out of eight events (Chen & Plott, 2002).  
These results sparked interest at other private-sector firms for using prediction 
markets to help forecast future sales or other market outcomes rather than relying 
on traditional forecasting methods alone. 
Siemens 
Siemens has used prediction markets for software projects.  Ortner (1998) 
describes an implementation at Siemens in which an internal prediction market 
correctly forecasted that the firm would fail to deliver a software project on time even 
when traditional planning tools suggested the deadline could be met.  The Siemens 
market, like HP, used a fully computerized double auction market with a software 
product called FX, developed by Kumo Inc. (Ortner, 1998). 
For this software project Siemens created two separate prediction markets.  
One asked a simple question: Can the project be finished in the planned time 
horizon?  The payoff rule was a simple winner-take-all design with Yes and No 
shares. Hence, the prevailing market price for a Yes security predicted the 
probability of meeting the planning time horizon, while the price of the No security 
predicted the converse probability. 
The second market was designed to predict the length of the possible delay.  
This market included two shares called Early and Late, with Early shares yielding a 
greater payoff if the project was on-time or only a few weeks late, while Late shares 
yielded a greater payoff if the project was four or more weeks late. In particular, the 
payoff structure for this second market was set up in a linear fashion such that Early 
shares paid the maximum of (1 - 0.2* weeks late) or zero, while NO shares paid the 
minimum of (0.2* weeks late) or one. This payoff structure is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Thus, if the market consensus predicted a one week delay, we would expect EARLY 
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Figure 1. Pay-off structure at Siemens.  
(Ortner, 1998) 
Siemens opened the market to all people working in the project except upper 
level management.  63 traders joined the market and about 50 became active 
traders.  Of the participant pool, 67% were developers, 31% group managers, and 
2% project managers (second level—first level managers were not allowed to join 
the experiment because of their manipulating power; Ortner, 1998).  The Siemens 
market did not use any uninformed traders. 
Results at Siemens: Initially, after opening the two markets, the winner-take-
all market YES shares approached a price of 0.43 and fluctuated between 0.43 and 
0.40 for approximately six weeks.  About one month prior to the deadline, the YES 
shares for the winner-take-all market plummeted indicating the market did not 
believe the project would reach its planned milestone, although it was still possible 
according to the traditional project plan used by the management team (Ortner, 
1998).  In the end, the market was closed when the project manager announced the 
milestone time limit was not reached.  So each YES share paid 0 and the NO shares 
paid 1.  In the second market, used to predict the time delay, after only 1 month of 
trading and more than 3 months before the scheduled deadline, the market 
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HP and Siemens’ experiences suggest that motivating employees to trade 
may be a major challenge, but the results of active trading can produce very 
valuable forecasts.  Both firms ran real money exchanges with a relatively small 
trading population (20–60 people) and subsidized market participation by either 
providing traders with a portfolio or matching initial deposits.  Even with the 
subsidies and small trading population, the predictive performance of these markets 
was remarkable. 
Microsoft 
Microsoft uses internal markets to predict whether projects will meet 
milestones articulated in their project plans.  Microsoft’s markets rely on an 
automated market maker that enables traders to access the market at their 
convenience to buy and sell contracts.  By using a market maker, traders can 
exchange contracts without relying on others’ willingness to buy or sell (the role of 
market-maker mechanisms is discussed in more detail later in this report). 
Microsoft’s prediction markets use multiple contracts, each representing a 
different predicted date on which a project will reach a certain milestone.  Microsoft 
also has run test markets in the past involving naïve and informed traders.  “Naïve 
traders did not impact the accuracy of market predictions because informed traders 
corrected market price fluctuations caused by naïve participants” (Corporate 
Executive Board, 2006, p. 10).  However, Microsoft currently limits participation to 
informed traders because uninformed traders are less likely to participate.  Microsoft 
selects its traders by targeting employees who have enough information to make 
educated trades and by selecting traders from different corporate functions to 
aggregate different types of information, giving more accurate results (Corporate 
Executive Board, 2006).  The only concern is excluding someone from the market 
who has relevant information, but has been overlooked by management.  Microsoft 
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5. Other Real World Prediction Market 
Applications and Results 
The Iowa Electronic Market, run by the University of Iowa, is probably the 
best known prediction market amongst economists.  The Iowa Electronic Market 
uses a double auction market with winner-take-all and index contract types.  It is a 
real money market with no endowment, and participation is open to anyone 
interested, but likely only attracts those particularly intrigued and aware of the 
market’s existence.  In 1988, the original Iowa experiment allowed trades in a 
contract that paid 2½ cents for each percentage point of the popular vote in the 
presidential election received by Bush, Dukakis, and others.  More recently, it has 
run prediction markets based on the 2008 presidential election, the 2008 
congressional elections, and the 2008 Minnesota senate election. 
The Iowa Electronic Markets have yielded very accurate predictions which 
outperform the forecasts from large-scale polling organizations (Berg, Forsythe, 
Nelson, & Rietz, 2001).  Figure 2 shows data from the four U.S. presidential 
elections between 1988 and 2000.  The horizontal axis shows the number of days 
until the election and the vertical axis displays the average absolute error between 
the prediction market price (linked to the two-party share of the popular vote) and the 
actual popular vote percentage earned in the election.  In the last week before the 
elections, the prediction markets have predicted vote shares with an average 
absolute error of approximately 1.5 percentage points, compared to the final Gallup 
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Figure 2. Information Revelation Through Time 
(Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004) 
The superior performance of the Iowa markets may be attributable to the fact 
that “traders are self-selected with a clear interest in predicting what will actually 
happen, rather than what they hope will happen” (Corporate Executive Board, 2006. 
P. 5). In a poll, respondents predict events without any context of others’ beliefs.  In 
a prediction market, each participant knows the current consensus and factors this 
information into decision-making. 
Another example of the relative performance of a prediction market comes 
from the Economic Derivatives market established by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche 
Bank.  This market is tied to macroeconomic outcomes, such as non-farm payrolls, 
retail sales, levels of the Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing diffusion 
index, and initial unemployment claims (Gürkaynak & Wolfers, 2005).  The market 
mechanism is a pari-mutuel system where all bets that the specified outcome either 
will or will not occur are pooled for a given strike price; this pool is then distributed to 
the winners in proportion to the number of options purchased.  The Economic 
Derivatives market uses multiple contracts, allowing traders to take a position on 
specified ranges in which the data will fall.  The outcome results in a probability 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 19 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Figure 3 compares the performance of the Economic Derivatives market with 
a survey of economists in predicting economic outcomes based on data gathered by 
Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2005).  This figure  shows that the market-based forecast 
approximates the information in the survey-based forecasts.  Additionally, the 
markets’ response to data releases are better captured in the market-based 
expectations than survey-based expectations, suggesting that the markets perform 
and react better than survey-based forecasting  (Gürkaynak & Wolfers, 2005). 
 
Figure 3. Forecasting Economic Outcomes 
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Table 2 summarizes some of the more popular prediction markets available 
for public trade. 
Table 2. Popular Prediction Markets 
Market Focus 
Iowa Electronic Markets 
<www.biz.iowa.edu/iem> 
Run by University of Iowa 
 
Small-scale election markets. 
Centrebet 
<www.centrebet.com> 
For profit company 
Northern Territory bookmaker, 
offering odds on election outcomes, 




For profit company 
 
Traded in political futures, financial 
contracts, current events, sports, and 
entertainment. No longer in business.
Economic Derivatives 
<www.economicderivatives.com> 
Run by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche 
Bank 
 
Large-scale financial market trading 
in the likely outcome of future 
economic data releases. 
Newsfutures 
<www.newsfutures.com> 
For profit company 
Political, finance, current events and 
sports markets.  Also technology and 




Non-profit research group 
 
Political, finance, current events, 
science and technology events 
suggested by clients. 
Hollywood Stock Exchange 
<www.hsx.com> 
Owned by Cantor Fitzgerald 
 
Success of movies, movie stars, and 




For profit company 
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6. Prediction Market Design: The Devil is in the 
Details 
The preceding sections of this report provide strong evidence of prediction 
markets’ power and potential when they are “done right.”  However, the problem is 
that it can be very difficult to design and implement prediction markets in the right 
way. Much of the remainder of this report, in fact, will detail a number of the 
significant pitfalls and concerns in prediction market design. 
Overall, it is a fair characterization to say that prediction markets may be very 
straightforward in basic principle, but in practice the devil is certainly in the details, 
and there are many details with which to be concerned. Everything from security or 
contact design, to trading rules, to incentives, to the number and characteristics of 
the traders, can influence the value and overall performance of any prediction 
market.  
Small changes in any of these market design elements can have significant 
effects on overall prediction market performance. Thus, when deciding how best to 
design and implement any prediction market, it always pays to follow the carpenter’s 
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7. Measuring Prediction Market Performance 
Of course, before we can even discuss the impact of specific market design 
elements on prediction market performance, it is important to understand that 
measuring prediction market performance is itself a potential quagmire. What does it 
mean to say that a prediction market is “working well” or “not working well?” How 
would you even know how well it is actually working? 
Prediction Market Prices as Predictors 
Because the “prediction” provided by any prediction market is primarily 
reflected in the market price of the asset or contract being traded, it is essential to 
understand the microeconomics driving this price determination. Most 
fundamentally, the price of any contract sold in a prediction market is determined by 
how much the buyer is willing to pay for that contract as well as how much the seller 
is willing to accept for that same contract. These willingness-to-pay and willingness-
to-accept amounts are determined by each trader’s perceived “value” for that 
contract. 
However, the perceived value of a contract traded in a prediction market is 
actually comprised of two elements: arbitrage value and intrinsic value. Arbitrage 
value is the potential financial benefit to the holder of a contract from reselling the 
contract at a higher price at some later point in time. Arbitrage value is the simplest 
interpretation of the “buy low, sell high” adage. 
The intrinsic value of an asset, on the other hand, is the expected financial 
benefit of holding the contract indefinitely, or until the market closes. In financial 
stock markets, for example, the intrinsic value of shares in a company would be 
equivalent to the net present value of dividends or other future disbursements or 
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Recognize that many people think about the value of shares in the stock 
market primarily in terms of their arbitrage value. The common thinking is something 
along the lines of, “I expect the stock price to rise significantly in the future, so I 
should buy shares now and sell them when the price goes up.” While certainly a 
profitable endeavor if such a forecast of the future stock price is true, the logic falls 
short of answering the key questions: Why should we expect the price to rise or fall 
in the future? What drives future price changes? 
If all traders focus only on the arbitrage value of contracts, then prices in 
prediction markets have little predictive value. In this case, the price in a prediction 
market would reflect only trader expectations about other traders’ price expectations, 
which in turn reflect expectation about other traders’ price expectations, creating a 
circular flow of expectations without any core foundation. 
Therefore, for markets to have any predictive power this flow of expectations 
of expectations of expectations must, at some point, end with an expectation 
regarding the intrinsic value of the contract. As long as the flow of expectations ends 
with some trader expectation of the actual financial benefit of holding the contract 
indefinitely, then the market price has some predictive value. In particular, the 
market price of a contract traded in a prediction market could be seen to have some 
value in terms of predicting the future events which will ultimately determine that 
contract’s true intrinsic value. 
Note that each layer of expectation which drives the market price creates 
additional potential for miscalculation or error. In other words, trader expectations of 
the intrinsic value of a contract are likely to be more accurate (collectively) than 
trader expectations of trader expectations of trader expectations of the intrinsic 
value. Thus, the more that trades in prediction markets are driven by expectations of 
intrinsic value (as opposed to expectations of future prices), the more reliable market 
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Thus, as we proceed to discuss the issue of measuring market performance, 
it is important to note that one criterion to apply is to determine whether a particular 
market design or practice fosters trading based more on perceived arbitrage value 
(generating less reliable predictions) or trading based more on perceived intrinsic 
value (generating more reliable predictions). 
Prediction Market Performance: A Relative Measure 
It is also important to note that prediction market performance (at least in 
terms of accuracy) cannot really be captured by any absolute measure. Instead, the 
only reliable way to measure prediction market accuracy is by using relative 
measures. In other words, any meaningful statement about the accuracy of a 
prediction market must be made relative to the accuracy of some other forecasting 
method. 
To understand this, suppose we wanted to evaluate the accuracy of a 
prediction market designed to predict the outcome of a coin flip.  In particular, 
suppose the contracts in this particular prediction market pay off exactly $1.00 if the 
outcome of the coin flip is heads, but pay off nothing if the outcome of the coin flip is 
tails. At what price should we expect contracts to trade in such a prediction market? 
The answer, of course, is 50 cents, which translates into a forecast of 50% chance 
of a heads outcome. 
Of course, we already knew that there was a 50/50 chance of heads versus 
tails, so would it be fair to say that the prediction market “failed” to provide a valuable 
forecast? Of course not. The prediction market not only gave a forecast which was 
as accurate as any alternative, but it in fact produced the most accurate forecast 
possible. 
As a further example, consider the forecasting accuracy of TV news 
meteorologists.  Suppose that the TV weatherman in Las Vegas is far more accurate 
at predicting his city’s annual precipitation than the TV weatherman in Seattle. Does 
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is simply an easier task to forecast the weather in Las Vegas than in Seattle. This 
example draws to mind the Los Angeles TV weatherman portrayed by Steve Martin 
in the movie L.A. Story who simply pre-tapes a week’s worth of weather forecasts so 
he can go on vacation. 
Thus, measuring the performance of any prediction market requires 
considering not only the nature and difficulty of the particular prediction challenge 
but also considering the performance of alternative forecasting methods. This makes 
reliably measuring prediction market performance a particularly difficult task, as the 
complexity of the prediction task may be poorly understood, and there may not be 
viable alternative forecasting methods to serve as benchmarks for comparison. 
Probabilistic Predictions: The Limited Observations Problem 
A cursory examination of prediction markets now in practice suggests that 
many, if not a majority, of these markets rely on trading winner-take-all contracts 
which, as discussed previously, pay off a fixed amount if and only if a specific event 
occurs. Recall that the market price of a winner-take-all contract reflects the market 
expectation of the probability of a specific future event. 
However, such probabilistic predictions introduce additional difficulty in terms 
of measuring accuracy. To see this, consider this statement from Todd Proebsting at 
Microsoft, who drew further on the weatherman analogy introduced above, noting 
that  
There’s a common ‘weatherman’ misunderstanding about prediction markets, 
especially in the press.  Perhaps counter-intuitively, a weatherman is not 
wrong if the sun comes out after a 90 percent forecast for rain because there 
was still a 10 percent chance of sunshine.  Instead, the weatherman is a good 
predictor if it rains 90 percent of the time when he gives a 90 percent chance 
of rain—any more or less would be poor predictions.  Prediction markets work 
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Thus, we cannot reliably measure the accuracy of winner-take-all prediction 
markets without a large sample of predictions to evaluate. Unfortunately, however, it 
takes time to generate such a large portfolio of predictions, and managers desiring 
to apply prediction markets as a decision tool rarely have the money or patience for 
extended “field testing” prior to actual reliance upon the market predictions. Thus, 
any prediction market design would need to be tested and evaluated extensively in a 
controlled “laboratory” environment prior to actual implementation. 
Measuring Performance by Measuring Information Aggregation 
It is also important to note that the basic premise of measuring prediction 
market performance based on forecast accuracy is itself inherently flawed. Decision-
makers, of course, ultimately are most concerned about the accuracy of any forecast 
upon which they rely. However, a perfectly designed and well-functioning prediction 
market may often produce fairly imprecise forecasts while, in contrast, a very badly 
designed and poorly functioning prediction market may produce comparatively more 
precise forecasts. 
How is this possible, you ask? The answer is rooted in the fact that the 
predictive power of prediction markets is fundamentally based on the ability of such 
markets to efficiently aggregate collective knowledge. In essence, prediction markets 
only reveal what is already known, but these markets add value by collecting and 
integrating knowledge that may be atomized, dispersed, and otherwise hidden. 
However, the accuracy of any prediction market forecast is ultimately limited by the 
accuracy of collective trader knowledge once it is gathered and integrated. In other 
words, garbage in, garbage out. 
Consider once again the example from Section 3 of this report, in which there 
are three possible (mutually exclusive and a priori equally likely) future outcomes, 
labeled A, B, and C, along with a prediction market in which traders buy and sell 
shares associated with each outcome (A shares, B shares, and C shares, 
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contracts, with each outcome’s associated shares paying off $100 each if that 
particular outcome occurs and paying off $0 otherwise. Hence, a prevailing market 
price of $X for a particular outcome’s shares indicates a market predicted probability 
of that outcome equivalent to X%. 
Now suppose we were trying to evaluate two competing prediction market 
designs—labeled design #1 and design #2—each with different rules or procedures, 
information or communication, endowments, market-maker algorithms, and so on. 
Consider what might happen if we were to compare the performance of these two 
competing market designs in terms of their ability to accurately forecast which 
outcome (A, B, or C) will ultimately occur in the scenario above. 
In testing these two competing market designs, of course, a different 
population of traders would have to participate in each market design. If some 
traders were to participate in both market designs, the “cross-contamination” of 
information would make it unclear which of the two designs should really be given 
credit (or blame) for the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of any given forecast. 
The two distinct populations of traders engaged in design #1 and design #2, 
however, would presumably have different collective bases of knowledge. So, 
suppose some traders participating in market design #1 know with certainty that 
outcome A will not occur while the remaining traders in this population have no 
special knowledge and thus consider outcomes A, B, and C all equally likely to 
occur. For the population of traders participating in design #2, in contrast, suppose 
that some of the traders know with certainty that outcome A will not occur, some of 
the traders in this same population know with certainty that outcome B will not occur, 
while the remaining traders in this population have no special knowledge and thus 
consider outcomes A, B, and C all equally likely to occur. 
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(1) Market design #1 produces final prices for each outcome of $0 for A, 
$50 for B, and $50 for C; 
(2) Market design #2 produces final prices for each outcome of $0 for A, 
$30 for B, and $70 for C; and 
(3) Outcome C does, in fact, occur. 
What might be concluded regarding the two market designs based on these 
observations? 
The easy answer would be to conclude that design #2 must be a better 
prediction market design (i.e., it has better rules, procedures, endowments, 
algorithms, and so on) because it forecasted a 70% probability of the correct 
eventual outcome (C), whereas design #1 only forecasted a 50% probability of the 
correct outcome. However, the truth is actually quite the opposite: Design #1 
outperformed design #2 in the basic dimension of prediction market success—
information aggregation. 
In producing final prices of $0 for A, $50 for B, and $50 for C, market design 
#1 achieved 100% information aggregation. The best estimate of the probability of 
outcome C occurring given the entire collective knowledge of the design #1 trader 
population was, in fact, 50%. However, in contrast, the final prices of $0 for A, $30 
for B, and $70 for C generated by market design #2 reveal a failure to fully 
aggregate the collective knowledge of the trader population. In particular, a fully 
efficient prediction market using the trader population of design #2 would have 
produced final prices of $100 for $C and $0 for the other two outcomes. Instead, 
however, market design #2 essentially “left knowledge on the table” and fell short of 
full information aggregation. 
Of course, an outside observer would be unable to recognize the superior 
performance of market design #1 in this example because the knowledge or 
information that is to be aggregated is hidden from observation. Therefore, in real 
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produced by the market but cannot ultimately know whether the particular market 
design was, in fact, doing its job by fully aggregating the collective base of 
knowledge within the trader population. 
Thus, the only way to truly evaluate the performance of prediction market 
design elements is to do so within a controlled setting in which you can observe the 
information conditions prior to implementing the prediction market. In particular, a 
researcher must control the information that is possessed by each individual trader 
by, in fact, being the sole provider of that information himself or herself. In sum, 
effectively evaluating potential prediction market designs requires the researcher (or 
evaluator) to induce the initial information conditions by providing certain information 
to each trader. The traders then buy and sell contracts using the market design 
under evaluation. Ultimately the researcher measures the degree to which the final 
market prices fully aggregate the information initially disseminated across the trader 
population. 
For this reason, it is strongly recommended that any future evaluation of 
prediction markets as a defense management tool include careful and 
comprehensive laboratory experimentation to evaluate and compare alternative 
market designs. The bottom line is that such controlled experiments, in which the 
degree of information aggregation can actually be measured, are the only true 
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8. Limitations of Prediction Markets as a 
Decision Tool: The Endogeneity Problem 
The remarkable accuracy of prediction markets in forecasting election results, 
economic outcomes, and other variables has managers in both the private sector 
and public sector intrigued by the possibility of applying these markets as a 
managerial decision tool. Some imagine using prediction markets to forecast 
consumer response to new product alternatives and then adjusting marketing 
decisions in accordance with these forecasts. Others envision using prediction 
markets to forecast the future success of the various elements within an 
organization’s research, acquisition, or investment portfolio and then allocating 
resources where the potential returns are most promising. The possibilities in which 
prediction markets might be able to guide decision-making seem endless. 
Unfortunately, however, there is an inherent limitation in using prediction 
markets for many decision-making applications. In particular, if the decision which 
the prediction market is intended to assist will itself impact the future variable(s) the 
market is designed to forecast, there exists an endogeneity problem that will limit the 
accuracy and/or usefulness of any such prediction market. In particular, decision-
makers may not be able to decipher whether the prediction market is providing a 
forecast of the future without any managerial action or whether the prediction market 
is, in fact, anticipating certain managerial action and therefore is forecasting a future 
which already incorporates the impact of the very decision the market is intended to 
assist. 
For example, consider a potential application of prediction markets to aid 
defense manpower decision-making. Suppose, in particular, that the Navy 
implements a prediction market forecasting retention outcomes (i.e., whether or not 
certain goals will be met or even the actual number of sailors retained). If this market 
forecasts low retention levels, the Navy might consider responding with corrective 
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efficient and effective prediction market should have already anticipated such action 
by the Navy, so the bonus increase could have zero or minimal impact on the 
retention levels forecast by the prediction market. Observing this, the Navy might 
then decide to increase retention bonuses even further, but rational traders in the 
prediction market would have anticipated this action as well.  The bottom line is that 
Navy decision-makers would never be able to know whether the prediction market 
was forecasting retention levels given the current bonus amounts or assuming some 
adjusted (unknown) bonus amount. Hence, the value of such a prediction market for 
guiding manpower decision-making would be seriously compromised. 
This endogeneity problem was one of the critiques of the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiative, which had prediction markets for 
terrorist acts and assassinations of certain world leaders.  For example, suppose 
that some intelligence analyst believed that a certain country’s leader was going to 
be assassinated.  That analyst would then buy shares in that outcome, driving the 
price up.  Officials would observe the increased market probability of that 
assassination occurring, so they may take steps to deter it, which would bring the 
probability and the price down.  Thus, the analyst’s well-informed investment would 
then lose money (or at least gain little to no return).  If the analyst had rationally 
anticipated these deterrent actions, however, he or she would never have made the 
investment in the first place, understanding that there is little opportunity for profit. 
So, how does one address this endogeneity problem? Our research has so 
far uncovered two different approaches in the area of prediction market contract 
design and trading: 
(1) decision-independent contracts, and  
(2) conditional contracts. 
A decision-independent contract is a contract whose prediction market price 
provides valuable information for a particular managerial decision under 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 33 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
example, a decision-supporting prediction implemented by Google to determine how 
many people would sign up for their e-mail services (Dye, 2008).  The purpose of the 
market was not to adjust marketing activities or other variables which could influence 
the outcome being forecasted, but rather to estimate how much bandwidth/storage 
to allocate to the e-mail services.  Thus, unlike the example of the prediction market 
for retention outcomes described above, the policy response to the Google 
prediction market would not affect the outcome forecasted by the market.  
Designing and trading conditional contracts is a second approach to 
overcoming the endogeneity problem when a prediction market is to be used as a 
decision support tool. Conditional contracts are contracts whose payoffs depend not 
only on the forecasted outcome, but also upon the presence of certain assumed 
prior conditions. For example, a conditional contract designed to forecast retention 
outcomes might be formulated around the following question: If a retention bonus of 
$10,000 is offered, how many Service members in this specialty area will be 
retained? Similar conditional contracts might be designed around bonus levels of 
$5,000, $15,000, or any other amounts under consideration. 
Such conditional contracts have the benefit that they are unaffected by the 
managerial decision they are intended to inform, and they also allow management to 
measure the direct variable they may be hoping to influence with their decision (in 
this case, retention levels). The primary drawback of such conditional contracts is 
that there must be a clear and non-distorting rule for how much these contracts pay 
off if the antecedent condition does not occur. In the example above, for instance, 
what is the contract worth if the retention bonus is ultimately not set at $10,000 or 
whatever amount was pre-supposed by the contract conditions? Note that, if the 
answer to this question is that such contracts become worthless, then their 
predictive value is destroyed because the value (and, thus, market price) of such 
contracts will always be downwardly influenced by traders’ estimated probability that 
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Instead, to maintain the predictive value of conditional contracts, the 
prediction market designer must formulate and publicize a “terminal value” rule that 
will not (or, at least, should not) have any effect on trader value for conditional 
contracts, and thus not create any market price distortion. For example, the terminal 
value rule could state that if the particular circumstance pre-supposed by a 
conditional contract does not ultimately occur, then each share of that contract will 
pay off an amount equal to the average market price over some period of time prior 
to market closing, or the end of trading for that particular contract. Such a rule for 
paying off “orphan” or “lame duck” conditional contracts should exert no pressure, 
upwards or downwards, on market prices, thus preserving the predictive power of 
these contracts. The only impact of such a rule should be to reduce trading and 
stabilize the market price, at a level indicative of the final prediction, as it becomes 
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9. Incentive Issues in Prediction Markets with 
“Play Money” 
An additional concern that is particular to applying prediction markets to 
defense management is the issue of trader incentives. In particular, due to legal or 
cultural restrictions related to pay for performance or even gambling, there is an 
aversion to using real monetary incentives for prediction markets involving 
government employees as traders. This raises a concern because the best 
performing prediction markets, whether as managerial decision-aids or forecasting 
elections and financial outcomes, have all used the potential for real money profits 
(or losses) as the traders’ incentive. 
Whereas there has been some research to indicate the potential value of 
prediction markets that employ only “play money” incentives (Servan-Schreiber, 
Wolfers, Pennock, & Galebach, 2004), these results must be interpreted with some 
skepticism. More specifically, this particular research investigated trading to predict 
the outcome of sporting events, for which many individuals have an inherent 
incentive to participate. For example, millions of people join fantasy sports leagues 
(which essentially involve predicting how individual athletes are going to perform) 
without any financial incentive, sometimes even paying to participate. The fact that 
individuals can be motivated to trade in sports prediction markets with only play 
money is thus not surprising. Such inherent motivation is far less likely to be present 
in prediction markets associated with outcomes of managerial interest, such as 
technological progress or cost inflation of a new product design. 
Some have argued that bragging rights or a sense of competition should be 
sufficient motivators for active trading in play-money prediction markets. Whether or 
not this is true, these non-financial incentives create their own problems. First of all, 
so-called bragging rights require non-anonymity. After all, one can’t brag about 
superior performance if others don’t know how well you have done. However, in 
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advantage. In particular, a trader may have inside information that a particular 
project is “doomed to failure” but, for political reasons, is uncomfortable revealing 
this information publicly. However, an anonymous prediction market would allow 
such a person to act on, benefit from, and disseminate this valuable inside 
information without speaking out publicly as a whistle-blower. 
There’s also a fundamental question regarding how trader performance would 
even be measured in such play-money markets. While it is a common practice to 
rank or recognize traders at any point in time based on the current value of their 
overall portfolio (cash-on-hand plus current market-value of all contracts held), such 
a measurement system has inherent problems. In particular, given that the purpose 
of the prediction markets is to forecast future outcomes, you would presumably like 
to recognize traders based on the accuracy and advance foresight of their 
predictions regarding these outcomes. However, ranking traders or measuring 
performance based on current portfolio value fails to do this, instead rewarding or 
recognizing traders for their ability to predict market prices (or other trader’s 
predictions) rather than the actual outcome of events in question. 
At any point in time, the true intrinsic value of any individual’s portfolio in a 
prediction market is unknown, and can only be evaluated after the forecasted events 
have occurred. To provide a concrete example, consider an individual who may 
have held an enormous amount of Enron stock before that company collapsed amid 
scandal. Prior to the Enron crash, such an individual would have been rated or 
ranked very highly by the portfolio value criterion discussed above when, in fact, he 
had actually been a very unwise investor. 
Sometimes play-money prediction markets are enhanced by offering a prize 
to the top trader or traders. Besides the performance measurement problem 
discussed above, this practice of rewarding (or even just recognizing) only the top 
performers creates additional market-distortion problems. In particular, such a 
reward-only-the-top approach disproportionately diminishes the value to traders of 
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For example, consider the decision-problem of a trader who is near the “back 
of the pack” as the prediction market approaches closure. Small or medium gains 
are worthless to the trader at this point, making the only trades of value those that 
have the potential for large gains that could immediately vault him into the group of 
leading traders who will be rewarded or recognized. Thus, the reward-only-the-top 
incentive approach drives traders to go for “home runs,” focusing on high-risk/high-
reward investments to the detriment of low-risk/low-reward investments. This could 
cause the market price of low-probability events to be overstated and the market 
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10. Security or Contract Design Issues 
While both public and private sector leaders are often easily intrigued by the 
potential benefit of prediction markets as a forecasting tool, our research indicates 
that they often find it far more difficult to actually identify future events to predict. In 
particular, the design requirements for a viable (and tradable) prediction market 
contract can prove surprisingly difficult to meet. 
For example, to produce reliable and valuable forecasts, a prediction market 
contract must be designed to measure something that is: 
 Important: First and foremost, the contracted event must be something 
for which the outcome is relevant to managerial decision-making. 
 Quantifiable: Prediction market contracts should not be based on 
subjective assessments of “success” or some other measure. Instead, 
there must be a specific quantifiable outcome measure on which the 
contract payoff depends (even if this measure is a zero/one yes or no 
measurement). 
 Clearly defined: The event in question and the potential outcomes of 
that event must be clearly understood by all traders. Moreover, when 
there are different potential measurements of the event it must be 
100% clear upon which measurement the contract pay off will 
ultimately depend. 
 Contingency covered: The contract pay off under all possible scenarios 
must be determined, specified, and clearly communicated. For 
example, what happens if the event in question does not actually 
occur? What happens if the measurement in question doesn’t take 
place? What happens in the case of a tie or other knife-edge outcome? 
 Decision-independent: As discussed earlier, the event being forecast 
cannot be affected by the managerial decision which the forecast is 
intended to support. 
 Subject to alternative forecasts: While not essential, it is valuable to 
employ prediction market contracts for events which are also forecast 
via other means (expert analysis, official estimates, opinion polls, etc.). 
Doing so allows decision makers to determine whether prediction 
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In principle, each of these contract design requirements is intuitively 
justifiable. However, in practice these restrictions may significantly limit the pool of 
potential events to be predicted. We discovered this firsthand when in a pilot 
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11. Student Pilot Study 
Two Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) students, LT Michael Chinn and LT 
Leslie Huffman, implemented a prediction market to explore prediction market 
applicability for manpower related outcomes.  The prediction market took place from 
early August 2009 through September 2009 and the results are reported in their 
MBA Joint Applied Project Report (Chinn & Huffman, 2009).  In conducting this 
experiment, Chinn and Huffman addressed five prediction market design issues:  
claim definition, claim structure, participation incentives, market participants, and 
trading mechanism.  The pilot test was funded through the Chief of Naval Personnel. 
Claim Definition 
The pilot study was initially planned to involve several prediction market 
questions related to manpower outcomes and a few “fun” questions to complement 
and encourage participation.  N1 had offered guidance on which manpower 
outcomes we were going to use.  However, as Chinn and Huffman (2009) detail, 
claim definition proved more difficult than expected; outcome measurements for 
some of the proposed claims were ambiguous or poorly defined, other proposed 
claims had largely predetermined outcomes or were likely targets for management 
intervention if they diverged from their final target values.  The final portfolio of 
claims included five with Navy relevance, either because they touched directly upon 
a Navy manpower outcome or because they involved general economic conditions 
that significantly impact Navy manpower issues: 
 What will be the Navy's end-strength (for officers and enlisted 
personnel) for FY2009? 
 On September 30, 2009, what will the Navy's FY10 enlisted accession 
goal be? 
 What will be the official September 2009 national seasonally-adjusted 
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 Will the Dow Jones Industrial Average (INDU) close above 9,400 by 
Close of Business (COB) on Friday, August 14, 2009?  
 Will the FY 2010 Defense Appropriation bill be signed into law before 
October 1, 2009? 
There were four other questions on baseball, football, and the Emmy awards.  
These were intended to add a little fun to the market and hopefully spur more 
involvement in the military-related outcomes.  The fun questions were introduced 
periodically throughout the pilot study to maintain participant interest throughout.  
Claim structure 
All claims were winner-take-all contracts, though some questions involved 
multiple securities with outcomes defined over a specific range.  As such, the market 
price for all contracts reflected the probability for that specific outcome. 
Participation Incentives 
Due to Legal and cultural restrictions, the pilot market was restricted to play 
money with the primary motivation being bragging rights for the top performers.  In 
this pilot it was possible to determine a final ranking because all contracts closed at 
the end of the pilot.  However, the value of bragging rights was limited because most 
traders registered with pseudonyms and could not be individually identified.  
Pseudonyms were used to provide participants anonymity as desired. 
Market Participants 
The pilot market sponsor identified 58 potential participants, 26 of whom were 
from within the sponsor’s organization, five were from the Naval Postgraduate 
School (the students and project advisors), and the others were from manpower-
related offices from throughout the Navy.  Participants were individually invited to 
participate in the pilot prediction market.  All participants were considered informed; 
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rights as the only incentive, uniformed bidders would not likely participate or provide 
any meaningful liquidity. 
Participation in the prediction market was very low, as feared.  Of the 53 non-
NPS potential participants, only 19 created an account and had at least one trade.  
Trading also fell sharply as time progressed, from 57 non-NPS trades in the first 
week, to 15 or less in the third week and all subsequent weeks.  The introduction of 
the fun questions had no apparent effect on the trading in the Navy manpower-
relevant questions.  
Prediction Market Trading Mechanism 
The pilot prediction market was implemented through Inkling Market’s website 
(http://inklingmarkets.com/).  The owner of Inkling provided the market platform free 
of charge; there is normally a charge per user.  The Inkling owner met with LT Chinn 
and LT Huffman, and was very helpful in establishing the market.  The Inkling 
platform involves an automatic market maker. Thus, one person’s wish to buy a 
stock does not depend on someone else wanting to sell the stock for an agreed-
upon price.  This is a critical design consideration in thin markets with limited 
participants and trading activity.  In addition, the Inkling interface is relatively easy for 
a user to understand, an important consideration for the inexperienced participants 
involved in this pilot. 
Lessons Learned: Implementing prediction markets is difficult 
The primary implementation issue in the pilot prediction market involved 
limited participation.  As mentioned above, participation was low and fell off 
dramatically.  In addition, adding fun questions had little impact on overall 
participation.  One potential explanation for low participation may involve the limited 
number of participants with relevant knowledge of the contract outcomes, even 
within the select group of invited traders.  The traders with little knowledge may be 
discouraged from participating because there are others in the market with a 
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to profit from trading.  For example, one participant sent a weekly message updating 
the current result for one of the securities.  Other traders likely felt a significant 
disadvantage in trading this security. 
A second problem is that the traders may not have the time to participate in 
the pilot prediction market.  In fact, some may think that those who participate 
frequently may not be busy enough with their regular work responsibilities.  Time 
requirements involve both individual trades and the initial investment to understand 
the Inkling prediction market platform and trading rules.  While the Inkling platform is 
relatively straightforward, some participants had a difficult time grasping the concept 
of short selling—that is to say, betting on the probability of an event (i.e., the price) 
going down.  On Inkling.com, all traders need to do is indicate that they think the 
actual probability is lower than the current price, then they are asked how much 
lower they think the true probability is.  Based on this information, inkling.com 
determines a number of shares to sell, or the trader can enter the number of shares 
to sell.  Therefore, it is straightforward, yet it is difficult to grasp.  Confusion over 
trading rules could limit trader participation. 
In addition, incentives to play may be inadequate.  The Navy currently 
precludes using real money.  In conducting the pilot PM, we were not able to offer 
iPods or other material incentives.  Still, other incentives could be used, such as a 
high-quality parking space.  However, such a system of rewarding the top money 
earner or the top few earners would compromise anonymity and create adverse 
trading incentives that could skew the true probabilities.  As described previously, 
rewards for top performers would encourage lower performing traders to make risky 
investments to capture the large potential pay-offs.  Thus, people would be more 
likely to buy securities for low-probability events and sell short against high-
probability events.  This would inflate the probability of low-probability events and 
understate the chance of high-probability events occurring. 
It seems essential to provide some participation incentives.  Participation in 
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pilot market was initially described as a student project, as opposed to a sanctioned 
Navy pilot, which may have further compromised participation. 
Lastly, implementing a prediction market is a time-consuming, difficult task.  
As highlighted previously, the devil is in the details when managing prediction 
markets.  It is critical to ensure that the securities are worded well without 
ambiguities.  Ambiguities could arise from many sources, including simple 
differences in how an outcome is defined.  For example, the pilot market considered 
a security involving the number of people waiting to join the Navy via the Delayed 
Entry Program (DEP). But, different Navy organizations used different methods to 
calculated DEP numbers.  Thus, this question could have caused too much 
confusion.   
There was a different problem in defining a security on reenlistment rates for 
nuclear-trained sailors.  Unbeknownst to the pilot market designers, the Navy had 
suspended retention bonuses for nuclear-trained sailors for the rest of the fiscal 
year, but the bonus was to be reinstated in the next fiscal year (recall the pilot 
market was conducted between August and September 2009, the last two months of 
the fiscal year).  Thus, no nuclear-trained sailors would reenlist until the new fiscal 
year.  While still feasible, the prediction market question on nuclear-trained sailor 
retention became uninteresting. 
These lessons learned highlight a few of the implementation issues involved 
in designing and running a prediction market.  If the details are improperly 
addressed, the markets will be confusing and uninformative, at best.  If early pilots 
are poorly designed, prediction markets may well be perceived as a flawed concept 
as opposed to a useful concept with a flawed implementation.  It is critical that early 
demonstrations be well designed and appropriately analyzed to allow the Navy and 
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12. Conclusion: The “Known Unknowns” of Military 
Prediction Markets 
Prediction markets are both powerful and complicated.  They provide the best 
available opportunity to aggregate disparate, decentralized information yet they are 
complicated mechanisms posing complex implementation issues.  There is 
substantial information regarding prediction markets in general, including information 
regarding claim definition, claim structure, participation incentives, market 
participants, and trading mechanisms.  At the same time, there are several factors 
regarding prediction market applications in Navy and Defense Department 
applications that are still poorly understood.  Critical issues involve market 
participation, contract definition, and performance measurement. 
One issue concerns whether the military-oriented prediction markets can elicit 
adequate participation to generate accurate predictions.  Having sufficient 
knowledgeable participation requires a combination of an adequate informed trader 
population and adequate participation rates among those potential traders.  While 
there is likely a large knowledgeable population for most defense-oriented issues, it 
is uncertain whether incentives are sufficient to draw traders into the prediction 
market and to keep them active over time.  Would defense markets be able use 
sufficient incentives, and, if so, what incentives could they use?  
A connected issue is how participation would be affected for short-term 
versus long-term securities.  In the pilot prediction market, all securities were 
relatively short-term (less than two months).  As mentioned previously, there were 
trades in the first two weeks, but the number of trades dropped off dramatically.  This 
may reflect participants’ loss of interest, or it may reflect other factors, such as little 
new information on the contract outcomes.  If a prediction were to start at the 
beginning of a fiscal year on what some outcome would be by the end of the fiscal 
year, it is uncertain how the participation would persist over the fiscal year.  It is 
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year would keep people interested in the outcome.  However, the new information 
might come out too sporadically to generate sufficient interest for participants to 
continue participating.  It is unclear whether government employees can be offered 
incentives that promote participation.  Using taxpayer money to pay incentives could 
cause problems, but there may be ways to address this. 
Another issue involves the outcomes that are good candidates for PM 
securities but are not self-defeating (endogenous).  As discussed above, outcomes 
in which policymakers would likely affect the outcome based on the prediction 
market contract prices are self-defeating.  This endogeneity likely encompasses a 
large share of potential defense outcomes (particularly in manpower applications).  
Still, there are likely good security candidate outcomes.  It is important to define 
contract outcomes so that they avoid policy intervention (e.g., predict intermediary 
variables as opposed to policy-relevant final outcomes), so that they involve ranges 
of potential outcomes, or so that they include payoff criteria if policy interventions 
alter the underlying conditions. 
Another uncertain issue is whether the success or usefulness of PM’s can be 
measured.  Previous attempts have not been satisfactory.  Outcomes are 
probabilistic events. We previously outlined a theoretical method of measuring the 
success of markets, but this required a large number of securities and known 
information conditions.  Performance measurement requires carefully controlled 
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